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INSTANT (GENDER) MESSAGING: EXPRESSION-BASED
CHALLENGES TO STATE ENFORCEMENT OF GENDER
NORMS
by TAYLOR FLYNN*
INTRODUCTION

Statements of identity, without more, have long been a potent form of demand
for inclusion and equal treatment. I Consider the signs carried by workers, most of
whom were African American, during the 1968 Memphis sanitation strike during
which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated. 2 They read, quite simply, "I
AM A MAN."3 Or, consider the rhetorical question posited more than one hundred
years earlier at the 1851 Women's Convention by Sojourner Truth, "Ain't I a
woman?"4 Both deploy statements of identity as a demand for racial equality.5 Nor
is it coincidental that both are framed in terms of gender: to be gendered as male or
female is to be considered fully human. It is one's humanity that serves as a point
of access to demand equal treatment.
As the terms "gender" and "identity" suggest, most challenges to state
enforced conformity with gender norms are almost solely status-based equality
claims. 6 Given that a common term deployed by members of the trans community

• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
I. For a thoughtful and well-theorized account of what the author terms claims of "expressive
identity," see generally Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I (2000) [hereinafter Hunter, Expressive Identity].
2. See Laurie B. Green, Race. Gender. and Labor in I960s Memphis: 'I Am a Man' and the
Meaning of Freedom, 30 J. URB. HIST. 465, 466-68 (2004) (analyzing the political and cultural
significance of the strike and its slogan, "I AM A MAN").
3. Id. at 465.
4. See generally BELL HOOKS, AIN'T 1 A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (\981)
(discussing the role of black women in the context of the women's rights movement).
5. See Green, supra note 2, at 468 ("Most broadly, 'I AM A MAN' drew on a political language
that considered manhood a universal signifier of humanity and independence, rejecting racist images
that cast blacks outside humanity or marked them as household dependents."); HOOKS, supra note 4, at
1-13.
6. See. e.g., Qz'etax v. Ortiz, 170 F. App'x 551, 552 (10th Cir. 2006) (Trans prisoner asserted
equal protection claim against state department of corrections because it treated inmates diagnosed and
treated for gender identity disorder prior to their incarceration differently from those diagnosed after
their incarceration.); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,735 (6th Cir. 2005) (Trans plaintiff who
suffered adverse employment action asserted Title VII and equal protection claims against state
employer.); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1980) (Trans Medicaid claimant asserted
equal protection and due process claims against state department of social services after it denied her
[465]
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and in antidiscrimination laws is "gender identity and expression,"7 situating such
challenges in expression may, at first glance, appear to be little more than linguistic
legerdemain. An understanding of gender as expressive, however, helps capture an
often unarticulated, yet central aspect, of the harm enforced conformity inflicts on
trans persons---compelled expression of the state's gender message over their
profound objection. Consider governmental insistence that a trans student or
employee present herself, through dress and grooming, in accordance with her sex
assigned at birth. The state is enforcing a selective message, which this Article
refers to as "the ideology of the binary." Unsurprisingly, it reflects the prevailing
view: there are two (and only two) distinct sexes with congruent gender identities,
fixed by nature and immutably different. 8
This coerced conformity, moreover, concerns an aspect fundamental to us all.
Our gender identity is central to the ways we understand as well as present
ourselves to the world; it is crucial to our health and well-being. Gender, and what
it presumptively says about us-{mr sexuality and sexual orientation, our place in
the multilayered hierarchy ranging from gubernatorial aspersions cast on "girlie
men"9 to a female presidential candidate denominated "one of the boys"l0
touches a raw nerve because it provides a myriad of social meanings about our
position(s) in the world.
It remains true, of course, that the binary model of sex captures the experience
of most people, who identify comfortably with the sex assigned them at birth. In
the majority of cases, the state's enforcement of this model is an umemarkable use
of legislative and administrative generalizations, necessary to enable the state to
govern effectively. In addition, the categories "male" and "female" importantly
enable the government to recognize and redress, through mechanisms such as

Medicaid benefits for sex reassignment surgery.). I am not a betting person, but I would venture my
(albeit meager) savings that· when the government (for instance, as employer or educator) requires an
individual to conform, over her objection, to gender norms, a lawyer's initial reaction is likely to be
framed in terms of gender role stereotyping rather than freedom of expression.
7. See, e.g., N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2008) ("The term 'gender' shall include actual
or perceived sex and shall also include a person's gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or
expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is
different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex assigned to that person at birth."); R.l. GEN.
LAWS § 28-5-7 (2008) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on "gender identity or
expression"); see also Transgender Law & Pub. Policy Inst., Non-Discrimination Laws that Include
Gender Identity and Expression, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm# (last visited May
13, 2009) (listing the number of jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender
identity).
8. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) ("The male chromosomes
do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically a post
operative female transsexual is still a male.").
9. Peter Nicholas, Schwarzenegger Deems Opponents 'Girlie-Men' Twice, S.F. CHRON., July 18,
2004, at A7.
10. Roxanne Rivera, Opinion, Nine Ways Hillary Clinton Could Win the Presidency, ELDR, Feb. II,
2008, http://www.eldr.comlarticle/politics/nine-ways-hillary-clinton-could-win-presidency (last visited
May 13, 2009) (stating that "Hillary [Clinton] should resist the urge to become one of the boys and
should embrace the femininity that helps her stand out from the pack").
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antidiscrimination laws or affinnative action, hanns created by the privileging of
male over female, including efforts to punish gender nonconformity. This Article
does not argue that the state cannot categorize people as "male" or "female," nor
that the state is required to create additional categories to accommodate individuals
whose gender identity falls outside of those descriptors (though the latter, in my
view, is nonnatively desirable).
The focus of this Article is on compelled expression over an individual's
objection, which is of particular concern given the state's role as enforcer. Not
only does the state have sole authority to legally categorize people by sex, but it
also uses those categories as the basis for distributing rights and goods, such as
marriage and its associated benefits, over which it maintains a monopoly of power.
The state likewise controls access to the countless protections that flow from the
wide-ranging use of government identification in our private interactions, such as
the ability to get a job, use a credit card, or interact with the public and government
authorities without fear of harassment, discrimination, or violence. Case law,
furthennore, reveals that state enforcement of gender nonns over one's objection is
inextricably intertwined with additional messages concerning the subordination of
gender outgroups. This messaging has as its foci the dehumanization of trans
people, the insistence on traditional gender roles for women, and the disapprobation
of homosexuality. II
Gender expression challenges also may have the potential, albeit over the
course of years, to benefit non-trans identified claimants. Sex role stereotyping
cases by trans plaintiffs at times meet with greater success than do those involving
what some might view as "garden variety" sex discrimination, such as the
requirement that female employees confonn to a feminine gender presentation by
wearing makeup. 12 It may seem ironic that such claims can fail where those by
trans litigants have succeeded. I3 However, it is precisely because gender nonns and
anatomical sex are for most persons congruent and binary that the decidedly non
congruent and non-binary nature of sex and gender is invisible to the majority.
Referring to this apparent paradox as seeing "pink on pink," this Article draws on
insights from critical race theory and argues that courts have difficulty reading the
expression of and, crucially, hann to non-trans identified women because their
message is rendered invisible against the background nonn of gender conformity.
Expression claims are neither a panacea nor substitute for challenges based in
autonomy or equality. A legal claim is but a jurisprudential approximation of the
constitutional values at stake, whether of equality, liberty, or free expression. And,
as with all rights- and identity-based claims, each of the three has serious flaws.
Flaws notwithstanding, the nonnative prescription proposed in this Article can be
encapsulated in a single word: more.

II. See infra text accompanying notes 69-98 (discussing consequences of state-enforced sex-gender
ideology).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-98.
13. See infra notes 209-229 and accompanying text.
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This Article proposes a long-tenn vision. Today, a person can identify herself
as female, have breasts, a vagina, a woman's body mass and muscle strength, have
no measurable amount of testosterone in her body, and be otherwise
indistinguishable in social interactions from any other woman, yet the vast majority
ofjurisdictions will declare her legally to be male. As an initial matter, there needs
to be more understandings of gender reflected in the law. This Article focuses on
expression because it offers the opportunity of more. In contrast to the most
common jurisprudential vehicle--equality--expression may better reflect the
complex and flourishing diversity of experiences that make up gender. In
particular, while equality claims tend to rely almost solely on a medical model of
gender identity, expression claims are also suited to non-medicalized claims by
trans persons, especially those for whom dissent from traditional nonns is integral
to their gender identity.
Part I considers gender within the context of the interwoven nature of equality,
autonomy, and expression, and asserts that First Amendment claims have the
potential to more fully represent a range of gender identities not comfortably
captured by the predominant rubric of equality. Part II discusses the ideology of
the binary. First, it examines ways in which state enforcement-not only of gender
roles but also the state's view of sex itself--constitute expression. Part II then
demonstrates through case law that while the overarching message sent by the state
is its insistence on sex as a fixed binary, this message is often interwoven with a
tapestry of a prescriptive ordering, one that subordinates women, trans individuals,
and gay persons.
Part III considers two highly schematized accounts of claims for inclusion by
trans individuals. The first represents the bulk of legal challenges and relies on a
binarized, medicalized understanding of gender variance. The second are claims
for inclusion outside of, and often in resistance to, a binarized and medicalized
experience of gender. The nonnative aspiration proposed in this Article is for
advocates to pursue expression-based claims within and outside of a medical
model. Part IV considers "the stuff of lawyers' work," examining obstacles to
potential symbolic and compelled expression challenges.
Lastly, Part V draws on what has been referred to as the "transparency
phenomenon" in critical race theory: the understanding that the background,
majoritarian nonns associated with whiteness are transparent to the white majority
because of their ubiquity. Applying this to the failure of gender claims by non
trans identified women, this Part suggests that courts fail to recognize the hann in
some traditional "pink" gender role stereotyping cases because that hann is
invisible when viewed against the "pink" background nonn of feminine gender
confonnity. I conclude that trans expression claims may offer the possibility, over
time, of making the invisible (more) visible, enabling courts to better see, for trans
and non-trans identified persons, the hanns of state-enforced confonnity with
gender nonns over an individual's objection.
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I. GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS: EQUALITY, AUTONOMY, AND EXPRESSION
It would be hard to capture the intertwined nature of equality, autonomy, and
expression in a Venn diagram: three circles with a common ground of overlap
would be far too neat to capture the complexities of this relationship. A rich,
scholarly literature examines many of these interconnections; it suggests, and I
agree, that the constitutional values underpinning these guarantees are not easily
severable, and that the doctrinal drive to do so has lead to significant drawbacks. 14
Nan Hunter, for instance, identified the development of a "new branch of equality
law" that she called "expressive identity" claims, which she described as "an
equality challenge in which the identity cannot easily be separated from a
message."15 Central to Hunter's analysis is the inseverability of identity from
expression inherent in these claims: expressive identity claims are at once 100%
status and 100% expression. 16 Similarly, Kenneth Karst described the right of
intimate association as an "organizing principle" that "retlect[s] various hues on the
constitutional spectrum" of free expression, equal protection, and both procedural
and substantive due processP
The normative desirability of taking a more synthetic, intratextual approach to
the Constitution often accompanies a discussion of the hybrid nature of such
rights. IS Although I endorse such an approach, it is unnecessary to consider here:
First Amendment claims can be brought as a supplement to or in place of equality
or autonomy claims; each basis is sufficient in se. For the purposes of this Article,
this tripartite interconnection is significant because the underlying values are
precisely those at stake in gender recognition cases. Chief among these values are
the development of autonomy and self-actualization; protection of minorities
(whether based on viewpoint or status); encouragement of diversity (among
individuals, groups, and views); and corresponding protection of the democratic
process l9 (as in Justice Stone's most famous offootnotes).2o

14. For in-depth, thoughtful analyses of the inter-related nature of these protections, see, for
example, Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and
Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. LJ. 1671 (2000) [hereinafter Hunter, Escaping the Expression], analyzing the
relationship between the right to equality and freedom of expression, and Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624 (1980) [hereinafter Karst, Intimate Association],
discussing the constitutional and social issues involved with establishing a "freedom of intimate
association." See also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 20, 23 (1975) ("The principle of equal liberty of expression underlies important purposes
of the first amendment.").
15. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 1591, 1592 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 1672.
17. Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 14, at 625.
18. See, e.g., id. (discussing the "pliable quality" of the freedom of intimate association and its
relationship to other constitutional doctrines).
19. See generally Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing interests at
stake in expression cases); Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 14, at 629-47 (analyzing the values
that intersect the freedom of intimate association).
20. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the need for
heightened scrutiny for all three clauses when necessary to check majorities' attempts to hijack the
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While gender-based expression claims face some substantial jurisprudential
hurdles and present difficulties of their own, they obviate others that are entrenched
in liberty- and equality-based claims. 21 Because the bulk of gender claims rely on
an antidiscrimination, rather than autonomy model, this Part considers common
failings of an equality approach only. Importantly, though, this Part does not argue
that First Amendment challenges should supersede those based in equality or
autonomy. Determinations such as whether and upon what ground or grounds to
bring a claim are at the heart of lawyering. The suitability of, say, an
antidiscrimination claim in conjunction with, or separate from, an expression-based
challenge turns on familiar considerations, such as the interaction of fact and
doctrine, the venue (administrative or judicial), and the wishes of the client.
Encompassed within these, however, is a consideration that may be less familiar:
the role of a client's gender identity. In attempting to address the basis of her
claim, it is inestimably important that the claims brought and the manner of
discussing them best reflect the client's self-understanding. While far from perfect,
expression-based claims have the potential to more fully represent a range of
gender identities not comfortably captured by the predominant antidiscrimination
rubric.
In a growing minority of jurisdictions, an antidiscrimination framework for
gender recognition claims has met with considerably greater success relative to
other doctrinal accounts. 22 Significantly, however, such wins have primarily
benefited trans persons whose bodies and lives most closely resemble traditional
norms-heterosexual individuals whose gender identity reflects a binary
understanding of sex and who have undergone surgical reconstruction so that
anatomy and identity are in alignment. Because the limits of equality claims have
been analyzed extensively elsewhere,23 this Subsection briefly sketches three
shortcomings: first, a jurisprudential rejection, by and large, of an antisubordination
approach to equality in favor of an insistence upon an Aristotelian model; second,
the paradox that a plaintiff must claim a particular (fixed) identity even if her
identity is more fluid or if the heart of her claim is a rejection of categorization in
toto; and third, equality's presumption of a formal disavowal of state-enforced
discrimination,24 in contrast to the First Amendment's distrust of government

political process at the expense of minorities).
21. See infra Part V.
22. See, e.g., Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New
Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 717 n.13 (2005)
(discussing strategies used by some jurisdictions to protect "transgender and gender variant people").
23. See generally Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of
Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83 (2008) (discussing various
paradigms to view discrimination claims raised by trans persons); Romeo, supra note 22 (discussing the
models by which trans persons may raise claims for discrimination and the barriers to redress they
encounter).
24. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 324-26 (1987) (discussing ways in which assumption of the
"perpetrator perspective" requiring conscious invidious intent in disparate impact cases presumes a
backdrop of non-discrimination).
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For each, these

A. An Aristotelian Approach Particularly Fails Trans Individuals

As
feminist
scholarship
has
emphasized,
the
Aristotelian
"sameness/difference" approach of ensuring that similarly situated individuals are
treated similarly means that there is often no protection for those deemed
"different"-frequently the very people most likely to be targets of
discrimination. 25 The command of treating "likes" alike can be especially
damaging for trans persons. Among courts refusing to recognize a person's
identified gender, a common (and dehumanizing 26) rationale is that trans
individuals are neither truly male nor truly female, and hence not "like" non-trans
men and women. In denying a marriage application where one party was trans, an
appellate court summed it up succinctly, stating, "[The court below] violated
neither of the applicants' equal protection rights. Rather, it was treating like cases
alike and unlike cases accordingly . ... In other words, this case was not the usual
case ...."27 Precisely because an understanding of trans identity is based on
individuals' variance from gender norms, the Aristotelian approach all but ensures
that claims by trans persons will rarely, if ever, be deemed "the usual case."
The polarity of difference, moreover, is presumed to mean something, and that
something often has an hierarchical cast. An Aristotelian methodology not only
fails to protect those deemed different, but it also glosses over a larger question
different from whom? As Catharine MacKinnon argued, the framework assumes as
its baseline the norms of the dominant group, against which the claims of the
subordinate group are measured. 28 This is particularly true when it is a sex-based
difference, understood within the prevailing account of essentialized binarism29
what the Supreme Court has termed the "inherent differences" between men and
women. 3D
These differences were framed as a "cause for celebration" by the Court in
striking down the ban on women attending the all-male Virginia Military Institute
in United States v. Virginia (VMl).31 The Court's celebration of these differences,
however, reflects a deep cultural investment in policing the gender lines.

25. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 225-27
(1989).

26. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
27. In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003) (emphasis added).
28. MACKlNNON, supra note 25.
29. For an in-depth discussion of the naturalized, binary model of sex, and my argument that it
represents a form of ideological expression, see infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. SIS, 533 (\996) (,"[I]nherent differences' are no
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men
and women, however, are enduring ....") (internal citation omitted).
31. 518U.S.515,533.
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Following on the heels of VML just four years later, the more oppressive aspects of
this investment were revealed in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization ServiceY There, the Court deployed "our most basic biological
differences" to justify unequal access to citizenship.33 As this result suggests, a
legal framework ostensibly dedicated to sex equality, but one that permits reliance
on the purportedly exogenous fact of natural differences, is, to put it mildly, a
porous one.
An Aristotelian approach obscures the extent to which the purportedly neutral
baseline in fact reflects the very norms a claimant may be challenging. When a
norm is so ubiquitous, it ceases to look like a norm; it simply becomes part of the
background-part of "the way things are." With respect to sex discrimination,
MacKinnon explained, "Concealed is the substantive way in which man has
become the measure of all things. Under the sameness rubric, women are measured
according to correspondence from man . . . . Gender neutrality is the male
standard."34 The dominant norm is rendered invisible; the markedness of
masculinity has disappeared. Similarly, enforced compliance with gender role
stereotypes may be especially likely to disappear for non-trans identified
individuals. 35 Consider, for instance, the gender norm of women wearing make-up.
While not all women wear make-up, a walk into any drugstore or five minutes of
television will attest to the norm's robustness. As discussed in Part II, expression
based gender recognition claims may help bring the background norm into relief.36
B. Fixed Identity Categories, Fluid Identities
Another shortcoming of an equality model is especially relevant for trans
individuals who identify as agendered or bi-gendered, or for whom their gender
identity is in other ways fluid. Postmodern scholarship contends that the demands
of equal protection jurisprudence reify identity-to make a claim, a litigant must
identify herself in a way that corresponds to the pre-ordained confines recognized
by the law. 37 Trans plaintiffs in successful sex discrimination cases typically
identify as transsexual and as either (uniquely and solely) male or female, an
identity that conflicts with their sex assigned at birth. 38 For those whose identity is
not fixed, making a claim as only "male" or "female" could require a plaintiff to
32. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
33. Id. at 73.
34. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 225-27.
35. See infra notes 210-219 and accompanying text (discussing a Ninth Circuit case in which the
court rejected the plaintiffs Title VlJ discrimination claim, unable to take seriously the harm
experienced by the plaintiff in being forced to conform to traditional gender norms).
36. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (explaining the use of gender and sex as forms of
expression and advocating for increased-use of expression-based challenges because doing so captures
an important element of the harm experienced by the transgender individual making the claim).
37. Gilden, supra note 23, at 85-86.
38. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling in favor of
transsexual plaintiff's Title VlJ sex discrimination claim, emphasizing medical testimony); Enriquez v.
West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (discussing "plaintiff's
gender dysphoria or transsexual ism" in employment discrimination case).
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undergo an injury similar to the one she is attempting to redress. Postmodem
scholarship posits that the process of asserting identity-based claims is not merely
Machiavellian: although she may adopt an identity for the purpose of a lawsuit, the
very act of adoption and the understanding of oneself as wronged based on that
identity is arguably disciplinary and constitutive. 39
Related to the reliance on a fixed, binarized assertion of gender, successful
cases typically rule in favor of trans litigants based on a biologized or medicalized
identity.40 These rulings frequently emphasize the medical profession's designation
of gender dysphoria as a medico-mental health condition. 41 In addition, these cases
often also focus on the extent, if any, of surgical intervention. 42 For persons
wishing to have the law recognize their identified gender under an equality model,
there is a pragmatic drive towards reliance on a medical model. 43 As discussed
below, expression claims with the greatest likelihood of success are those that
likewise rely on a medical model. Nonetheless, I argue that expression claims offer
claimants who reject reliance on a medical model an opportunity for success that is
effectively foreclosed by status-based claims.
In addition to any individual harm, the process of claiming a biologized and
medicalized identity may serve to re-inscribe the very categories the plaintiff is
seeking to challenge. Consider an example that may be more familiar-the law's
classificatory response to and re-inscription of race-based difference. 44 Homer
Plessy's suit, for instance, was not framed as a direct chaUenge to segregation, but
rather, as a claim of mis-categorization: in essence, he argued that he was white and
not black; therefore, he belonged in the whites-only car. 45 Homer Plessy's claim
can be read, particularly thorough a contemporary lens, for more radical meanings.
It may be seen not only as a chaUenge to segregation, but also as a rejection of
state-enforced racial categorization as weU as the biologized construction of race.

39. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
140 (1990) (re-theorizing feminism's relationship to identity by applying Foucauldian notion of
productive, disciplinary power); Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects, and
International Law, 15 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISISPRUDENCE 281, 282-83 (2002) (discussing Judith
Butler's performative theory of gender).
40. See supra note 38 (discussing Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, and Enriquez, 777 A.2d 365).
41. See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 370 (explaining plaintiff's gender dysphoria by reference to her own
mental impressions in addition to current medical research relating to the development of the brain).
42. See, e.g., id. at 368-69 (discussing the plaintiff's transition from male to female as beginning
with her external transformation in appearance and ending with her surgical procedure).
43. See Romeo, supra note 22, at 724-30 (noting courts' increasing reliance on the medical model to
grant at least some basic legal protection for transgender litigants and attributing such reliance on
medical regulations becoming more visible and uniform); see also infra notes 98-124 and accompanying
text (discussing expression identities that both reject and rely upon the medical model).
44. The oppressive history of race discrimination raise challenges that are at once distinct from and
importantly intersect with the oppression arising from discrimination based on sex or gender, with
severe violence and marginalization inflicted on trans people of color. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A
Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 372-76 (\991).
My focus here is on the vicious circle created by the state's creation of, and litigants' challenges to, race
and sex-based classification systems.
45. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
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Significantly, the law's structure meant that Mr. Plessy had to frame his claim
within the confines of racial identity as envisioned by those in power at the time.
He thus was required to run the risk that a successful claim would reproduce even
(and ever) more intricate levels of racial apartheid, as courts determined how much
"whiteness" was "white enough" to fit the racial identity standards of the day.
History revealed that such rulings, nonetheless, became part of the legal landscape
as courts adjudicated whiteness and blackness for others who did not fit neatly into
a racial binary.46
In a similarly biologized fashion, trans men, for instance, are asked highly
intrusive questions concerning penis length in an attempt to determine how much
"maleness" is "male enough."47 And the many trans individuals whose gender
identity does not fit neatly into a male-female binary must nevertheless frame their
claims within the confines of this model. An expression claim does not eradicate
the need for sex-based categorization, and I do not argue that the state is required to
supplement or otherwise change its binary rubric: I assume, arguendo, that plaintiff
ultimately seeks recognition as either "M" or "F."48 Deploying expression as the
means to achieve that end, however, shifts the focus to the particular message that
the trans person was sending regarding her gender identity.49 A shift of this nature
may allow for a more encompassing discussion of the claimant's individual gender
variance. Particularly given that law and identity tend to act over time as a
"feedback loop," this may, in tum, slowly mise awareness that there are many
possible narratives and experiences of gender.
C. Equality's Search for the "One Bad Apple"

First Amendment law is arguably more suspicious of government power than
are the vast majority of cases involving sex discrimination claims. For the latter,
where there is no facial sex-based classification, but where discriminatory impact is
overwhelming,50 the law is disturbingly unsuspicious of government power. As
critical theorists have discussed, equality law in disparate impact cases in effect

46. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 774-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (deciding whether multi-racial
petitioner was of "African descent"); see also Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531, 535 (finding that
Mexicans "are members of ... [the] white race as distinguished from ... the Negro race" and declining
to fmd jury selection cases with respect to African American jurors applicable), rev'd, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
47. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (detailing the intrusive nature of some of the
questions asked oftransgendered plaintiffs).
48. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 570 (factually portraying plaintiffs gender identity as complex yet
designating plaintiff as a male for the purposes of outlining a prima facie case of employment
discrimination).
49. See, e.g., Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (finding plaintiffs particularized message to be her
identification with the female gender as evidenced by her dressing in clothing traditionally associated
with the female gender).
50. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (upholding veteran's
preference for civil service promotions, even though ninety-eight percent of veterans are male, on
ground that heightened scrutiny applies only where plaintiff can prove that state acted "because of,"
rather than "in spite of' an intent to discriminate).
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presumes that there has been a formal disavowal of gender discrimination by the
government. Instead, applying what is often called by critics a "perpetrator
perspective," the law attaches liability only in those rare cases where the plaintiff
can point to the presumably exceptional evildoer who acted with conscious
discriminatory intent. 5I Gender discrimination thus is portrayed as an anomalous
rather than as an on-going threat.
Expression jurisprudence, in contrast, reflects a deep and abiding skepticism
of governmental regulation of expression. Inherent in the structure of the First
Amendment is concern with the use of state power to coerce conformity, and a
corresponding reliance on the amendment's guarantees as a bulwark against
totalitarianismY As discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III below, expression
claims may help move the analysis away from equality's status-based conflation of
anatomy as designated at birth with gender identity and expression. Instead, First
Amendment challenges have greater potential to shift the focus to the reasons for
the government's regulation of the plaintiffs gender expression, including the
imposition of the state's own sex-gender ideology.
II.

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BINARY

A. Gender and Sex as Expression

As the scholarly literature attests, the understanding of gender as expressive is
anything but new. 53 A person's gender presentation (as masculine, feminine,
androgynous, multiple, or fluctuating) occurs against a backdrop of shared social
and cultural understandings of what it means to be male or female. The words
"sissy" and "tom-boy" are a testament to our collective ability to "read" gender and
interpret failures to conform to gender norms. Central to any consideration of
gender theory is Judith Butler's preeminent work on the performativity of gender. 54
Butler argued that we all perform our gender: gender exists through the repeated
performance of it, which legitimizes and substantiates it through its continual

51. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 563-65 (1977)
(setting forth a limited number of situations in which a plaintiff may be able to prove invidious intent);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (l976) (holding that a showing of disparate impact would
not be sufficient to establish an equal protection claim, instead requiring discriminatory intent on the
part of the state actor); see also Lawrence, supra note 24, at 324-25 (discussing the requirement that
there must be discriminatory intent to bring a claim for equal protection).
52. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("!fthere is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.").
53. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal
Conceptualization of Gender that Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, II MICH. J. GENDER & L.
253, 276 (2005) ("Gender is expression-physical, mental, spiritual, sexual, inter-relational, connective
expression .... Gender is that expressive, relational, embodied self.").
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Judith Butler's theory of gender
performativity).
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(re)enactment and expression.55
Gender norms, moreover, are ideological
expressions. 56 Some may object to the characterization of gender as ideology.
However, with its focus on the societal roles expected of men and women, the
content and contours of concepts like "masculinity" and "femininity," and the
gender identity and presentation of persons who transgress gender norms, gender
itself is a study of ideology, precisely in the sense contemplated by Merriam
Webster.57
The dominant view of sex as binarized and essentialized likewise is ideology.
Gender theory has long understood this. Butler argued that it is through the
performance of gender that our notion of sex is produced: these repeated gender
performances instantiate sex as "natural," binary, and heterosexual. Sex and gender
thus function as norms which themselves produce the bodies that are governed. As
Butler states, sex is not a "static condition of a body, but a process whereby
regulatory norms materialize."58
Those skeptical of gender theory may find a medical evaluation of sex to be
more convincing. If asked to explain sex differentiation, most of us would refer
immediately to biology, drawing perhaps on the filmstrips we saw in sex or health
education class in junior high school-a discussion of boys and girls, distinguished
by chromosomal make-up, genital and other reproductive anatomy, the
development of secondary sex characteristics-all presumed to line up, along with
one's gender identity, unproblematically. As an initial matter, medical and
scientific communities overwhelmingly would corroborate this view: as we all
know, the first governmental record of our lives begins with a doctor's genital
check of a newborn and the "M" or "F" on our birth certificates. Because this view
is deceptive in its apparent ubiquity, it is important to note that sex and gender
dualism has not been the sole method of ordering our world: cutting across cultures
and time-periods, more capacious views of sex and gender, often characterized by
inclusion ofa third sex, have emerged. 59

55. BUTLER, supra note 39, at 140.
56. See generally David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001,
1007, n.44 (2002) (describing "gender fundamentalism" as the belief that men and women are, and
should be, fundamentally different and noting that "[t]he sex/gender system then is something of a
misnomer, as a sex/gender system might be regarded as just another term for a gender ideology"); Ariela
R. Dubler, In the Shadow ofMarriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction ofthe Family and the
State, 112 YALE LJ. 1641, 1644 (2003)(describing the traditional model of marriage as premised on the
gendered model of male providers and female dependents); Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal
Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 339-52 (1999)
(discussing gender as ideology).
57. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/
ideology (last visited May 13, 2009) (defining "ideology" in one definition as "a manner or the content
of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or CUlture").
58. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 2 (1993).
59. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 265, 275-78 (1999). From the Native American recognition of persons
known as two-spirit or berdache, to Hiljas in India, to the recognition of intersex children in certain
regions of the Dominican Republic and Papua New Guinea, societies have recognized and continue to
recognize what is frequently referred to as a third sex, persons typically possessing both male and
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In spite of contemporary western society's initial narrative of sex, however,
these same doctors, when pressed for a more detailed explanation of sex, would
convey a picture that is far less tidy. Millions of people do not fit neatly into an
"M" or "F" category. Experts, for instance, estimate that one in every 1500 to
2000 babies is born intersexed, having some combination of anatomical, hormonal,
and/or chromosomal characteristics that are neither clearly male nor female. 60 For
infants born with ambiguous genitalia, the ability of social norms to literally
construct sex is at its most stark. In a practice that denies intersex children the
ability to identify their own gender later in life and to control their reproductive
capacities and sexual functioning, many doctors continue to routinely undergo
surgery on the newborn.
The child's sex is determined by the medical
establishment's heterosexist assumption that men must have a penis capable of
penetrating a vagina: if the infant has a developed but undersized penis, the child is
often surgically constructed into a girl and given female hormones. 61
For these intersexed children, women are constructed (figuratively and
literally) as "men minus." As one specialist stated, "In the absence of maleness,
you have femaleness."62 While precise numbers are not known, due in part to a
fear of exposing oneself to discriminatory treatment, estimates concerning the
incidence of intersexuality and transsexual ism range from one-half of one percent
of the population to four percent; there are, in addition, many other individuals who
identify as transgender or are in some way gender variant. 63 This essentialized tale
of two sexes with congruent gender identities is ideological because it is a selective
slice that ignores what is known about the larger understanding of sex. Although
many people fall within a binary model, the full range of sex differentiation is
anything but binary-with some researchers, positing multiple sexes or describing
sex as a continuum along a male-female spectrum.64 Still others, particularly those

female qualities. Id. at 275-76. Other cultures and contexts have also recognized a third sex, including
in early English law and in some Jewish and other religious texts. Id. at 277-78.
60. Intersex Soc'y of N. Am., How Common Is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last
visited May 13, 2009).
61. See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A
Comparison ofthe Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 934 (2002)
[hereinafter Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race] ("Therefore, if an XY infant is born with a penis
that is less than 2.5 centimeters when fully stretched, the XY infant is surgically and honnonally turned
into a girl, despite the fact that this treatment may deprive the person of the ability to reproduce as an
adult male and the fact that the child's eventual gender identity may well be male."); Suzanne J. Kessler,
The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management ofIntersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3, 9-17 (1990)
(discussing how doctors should proceed when detennining the sex of an "intersex" baby); Catherine L.
Minto et aI., The Effect of Clitoral Surgery on Sexual Outcome in Individuals Who Have Intersex
Conditions with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Cross-Sectional Study, 361 LANCET 1252, 1256-57 (2003)
(discussing negative effects of intersex surgeries on women including inability to orgasm).
62. Kessler, supra note 61, at 15.
63. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race, supra note 61, at 927 n.53.
64. Some researchers, for instance, have posited that there are five sexes; others refer to sex as a
continuum, an infinite number of points along a male-female spectrum. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING,
SEXING THE BODY 78-79 (2000) (describing five sexes: traditional male, traditional female, henn (true
hennaphrodite with both an ovary and a testis), menn (pseudo hennaphrodite with ovaries but
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who focus on gender identity as the detenninant of sex, view sex not as a binary or
continuum, but as an infinite number of points in a three-dimensional world, a kind
of "hyper-space" of sexual identities that includes, among many others, persons
who are bi-gendered, non-gendered, and androgynous. 65
While my own view is most aptly conveyed by the latter, I am not concerned
with arriving at a definitive understanding of sex, if such a thing were even
possible. Nor do I do not mean to imply that the rights of trans individuals tum on
the number of people affected or on whether there may be some biologic basis for
an individual's gender variance. In fact, even the understanding of what constitutes
biological sex is contested, particularly with respect to the etiology of gender
identity.66 To the contrary, the common understanding of the distinction between
sex and gender, in which the fonner is privileged as natural and more authentic or
"real" than gender, is itself ideological. For my purposes, the most important
distinction concerning sex and gender is precisely that the two are not distinct. Our
conception of what constitutes a biological male or female is as socially
constructed, contingent, and laden with political and cultural meaning as our
conceptions of masculinity, femininity, and "appropriate" gender roles. An
understanding that dichotomizes sex and gender, privileging the fonner, in
conjunction with the insistence on (an again hierarchical) male-female binary, is
what I refer to as "sex-gender ideology."67
While in the majority of cases, the state's enforcement of this model is an
unexceptional use of administrative generalizations, my focus is on instances in
which an individual is legally categorized as male rather than female, or vice versa,
over that person's objection. I urge an increased use of expression-based
challenges both because expression captures an important element of the harm to
trans individuals and because it properly directs attention to the role of the state in

traditional male genitalia), and fenn (pseudo hennaphrodite with testes but traditional female genitalia));
Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race, supra note 61, at 927-35 (exploring race classification systems
and their effects on multiracial individuals and using these systems and their effects to enlighten a
discussion of the effects of binary gender classification on transgendered people).
65. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Relmodeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ.
15, 29-30 (2003) (advocating for policy which would recognize "diverse gender expression and
identities"); Vade, supra note 53, at 273-78 (describing a non-linear "gender galaxy").
66. Researchers are increasingly rejecting an older model that posits intersexuality as more
biological in origin than transsexual ism, which is typically described in tenns of a person's
psychological discomfort with her anatomical sex, based on a gender identity different from that
assigned at birth. See generally Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Henriette A. Delelmarre-van de Waal &
Louis J. G. Gooren, The Treatment ofAdolescent Transsexuals: Changing Insights, 5 J. SEXUAL MED.
1892, 1892-97 (2008), available at http://www.imatyfa.orginewsl08sep-cohen-kettenis-jsm2008.pdf
(describing the changing policy relating to gender identity disorders as a response to the changing
understanding of the biological basis for such understanding). While the precise etiology of gender
identity is not known, many experts point to a significant biological basis, influenced by a complex
mixture including pre-natal honnones, genetics, and fetal brain development. /d. As a result,
researchers are increasingly characterizing transsexualism as an intersex condition. Id.
67. For these reasons, I at times use the tenns "sex" and "gender" interchangeably (most typically
employing the tenn "gender" in ways that may sometimes encompass what some may understand to
constitute anatomical sex) as well as in combination.

Spring 2009]

INSTANT (GENDER) MESSAGING

479

enforcing a selective message about sex and gender. Trans people of course face
difficulties created by private as well as state power. Nor is "the state" a
monolithic entity; it consists of judgments by individuals that reflect, by and large,
the social narrative of sex. The state, however, not only maintains a monopoly of
power to legally categorize people by sex, but also uses those categories to
distribute benefits such as those related to· marriage over which it likewise
maintains monopolistic authority. Furthermore, it controls access to government
identification, affecting an infinite array of private and governmental interactions,
and placing trans individuals with non-conforming I.D. at risk of harassment,
discrimination, or violence. 68
B. State-Enforced Sex-Gender Orthodoxy and the Subordination ofOutgroups

Federal, state, and local government agencies enforce their own selective sex
gender ideology on a daily basis, deeply touching all aspects of an individual's
life-from the issuance of passports, driver's licenses, and birth certificates, to
petitions for legal name changes, to the enforcement in forty-six states of the
mixed-sex requirement for marriage, and the determination of legal parenthood. 69
Judicial opinions illustrate the myriad ways in which refusal to recognize a
person's identified sex is expressive, and the pronouncements are remarkably
consistent. The overarching statement is insistence on sex as a fixed binary.
Intertwined within this is a message of subordination (and superordination) with
respect to three gender-based outgroups: persons who are trans (rather than gender
conforming); female (rather than male); and gay or bi (rather than heterosexual).
The first is typically communicated through a portrayal of trans people as non
natural, dehumanized, and "other." The subordinate position of women is
frequently expressed by an emphasis on whether a trans woman can adequately be
sexually receptive to a penis. The last is an anti-gay insistence on heterosexuality
as an integral component of one's identification as male or female. The result is a
tapestry of a prescriptive ordering, with the same threads often communicating a
message of disapprobation of these outgroups simultaneously.
The expression of trans people as a non-natural and de-humanized is the
corollary to the view of sex as immutably created by nature or, as implied in a few
decisions, by divine authority. As David Cruz argued, "gender may effectively be
conceptualized on the model of religion," each functioning as ideology, with resort
to extra-human authority as an underlying justification for the particular form of
social organization for each. 70 One appellate court, for instance, framed the
recognition issue before it as whether "a person's gender [is] immutably fixed by
our Creator at birth,"7! responding in the affirmative by concluding, "There are

68. Romeo, supra note 22, at 715.
69. See id. at 715-16 (noting that government aid programs are designed to condition assistance on
personal decisions of recipient, including job choice and family structure, based upon what legislatures
define to be socially desirable).
70. Cruz, supra note 56, at 1005-06.
71. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224 ("The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a
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some things we cannot will into being. They just are."72 Whether from God or
nature, this essentialized view of sex leads almost ineluctably to a comparative
. portrayal of persons outside this schema as unnatural or non-human. As the
sanitation workers' claims to manhood73 and Sojourner Truth's assertion of her
womanhood74 powerfully convey, to be gendered is to be fully human.
An Ohio appellate decision refusing to issue a marriage license to a trans man
and his female partner, In re Marriage License for Nash,75 illustrates the way in
which assertion of sex-gender ideology almost inescapably involves intertwined
messages of subordination with respect to trans persons, women, or gays.76 The
court opened by fleetingly acknowledging that a fixed, binary view of sex does not
represent the complete picture, stating: "[w]e recognize that there are people who
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized category of male or female,"77 but
insisting nonetheless on the fixed, essentialized view that "one's gender at birth is
one's gender throughout life."78 The court then quite literally portrayed trans
women and men as neither male nor female by reading them out of Ohio's marriage
statute, finding it inapplicable on the ground that "the 'words' ... 'male,' and
'female' ... do not encompass transsexuals."79 The court, as have others, further
treated gender transition as a matter of humor or ridicule, noting that, for male-to
female genital surgery, "'amputation is a pretty important step. "'80
In a circular move that perpetuates heteronormativity, the Nash court reasoned
that Nash's original female-designated birth certificate was evidence sufficient to
rebut the prima facie case of maleness established by his amended, male-designated
birth certificate, even though the amended certificate was issued for the very
purpose of replacing the original. 8l Then, after relying on the original birth
certificate as conclusive evidence of his sex, the court invoked Ohio's anti-gay
marriage ban as a shield. The court refused to grant full faith and credit to the
amended birth certificate on the ground that to do so would violate Ohio's public
policy against same-sex marriage, thereby simultaneously asking and answering the
question before it. 82

physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?").
72. Id. at 231.
73. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
75. Nos. 2002-T-OI49, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095.
76. Id. at *9.
77. Id. at *7 (quoting In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002».
78. Id. at *9 (quoting Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991».
79. /d. at *6 (quoting Gardiner, 42 PJd at 135).
80. Id. at *8 (quoting Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31); see also Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155,
160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("Assuming ... that defendant was a male entrapped in the body of a
female, the record does not show that the entrapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to
perform male functions during marriage." (quoting Frances B. v. Mark, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted».
81. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *5.
82. Id.

Spring 2009]

INSTANT (GENDER) MESSAGING

481

Unlike the cases discussed below, the majority in Nash does not directly
express messages that place women in a subordinated role. The Nash dissent,
however, rather bluntly got to the heart of the majority's sex-gender ideology by
comparing the majority's decision to infamous cases upholding sex discrimination
based on the view of women as inherently different from men. Referring to the
majority's conclusion that trans individuals are neither truly male nor female, the
dissent likened it to the statement in Muller v. Oregon 83 that a woman
"[d]ifferentiated ... from the other sex ... is properly placed in a class by herself
. . . ."84 This status as immutably different is what made legally acceptable the
"plethora of paternalistic legislation and judicial decision making based on
'indisputable' natural law and thinly veiled religious dogma that portrays women
and other folk as fragile and somewhat moronic creatures incapable of protecting or
thinking for themselves."85 For the dissent, it is the notion of essentialized
"otherness" that perpetuates subordination.
Even some courts that recognize a person's identified gender may do so in a
way that perpetuates sex role stereotypes. Particularly for cases challenging the
validity of a marriage in which one spouse is trans, courts typically consider the
parties' ability to engage in heterosexual intercourse, grounded in notions about the
proper role and use of women's and men's bodies. 86 It may initially seem
unproblematic for a court determining the validity of a heterosexual marriage to
consider the parties' ability to engage in heterosexual intercourse.
That
determination, however, presents a highly troubling use of state power, fraught
with threats to equality and liberty. The state must posit what heterosexual sex
looks like, which is rife with potential for gender role stereotyping and, when
applied to the couples before the court, is breathtakingly invasive.
Courts that adopt an essentialized sex-gender binary are uniform in their
insistence on a "missionary" model of heterosexual sexuality-one in which the
man's role is distilled to penetration and the woman's role to passive receptivity.
Moreover, the court's sensationalist and prurient prying into the couple's sex life is
reminiscent of the oppressive wielding of state power through sodomy laws, ruled
unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. 8? Transgender marriage trials have included
weeks of testimony-some of which have been broadcast nationwide-on the
sexual positions and practices of the couple, detailed descriptions of the trans

83. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
84. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *11 (Christley, J., dissenting) (alteration added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22).
85. Id. at *10 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)).
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Joy and John R., No. E039132, 2007 WL 2319143 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 15,2007) (in determining whether the marriage was based on fraud the court heard and considered
evidence of sexual relations between the couple).
87. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For evaluations of the impact of Lawrence v. Texas in the context of sex
recognition cases, see Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184 (2004); Nancy J. Knauer,
Lawrence v. Texas: When "Profound and Deep Convictions" Collide with Liberty Interests, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 325 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil
Unions After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. LJ. 1265 (2004).
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person's genitalia, and questions such as whether he or she urinates while seated or
standing.88 This intrusion into the deeply personal aspects of one's intimate
relationship is compounded by the enforcement of prescribed gender roles. For
trans women, the focus, as framed by one court, is whether she has a "normal"
vagina that could "function as any female vagina,"89 which the court defined as
being for the purpose of "traditional penile/vaginal intercourse."9o For trans men,
courts inevitably focus on whether the man has a penis deemed large enough for
penetration, such that intercourse with his wife could be adjudicated sufficiently
heterosexual. 91 The state's insistence on male penetration and female penetrability
sends messages, respectively, of activity and passivity, dominance and
subordination.92 In short, the use of state power to intrude into one's intimate life,
with its insistence that sexuality be performed within the confines of traditional
gender roles, targeted solely at an unpopular group, is a stark reminder of the
interconnected nature of autonomy, equality, and expression.
In an unusual case, one court reversed itself on rehearing, directly
acknowledging that it had overstepped in these realms. 93 At issue was a trans
woman's petition for a name change. Cynthia Frank was caught in an all-too
common catch-22 for people who are transitioning: she sought the name as part of
her gender reassignment protocol-a protocol typically required by the medical
"gatekeepers" who control access to gender reconstructive surgeries, but the court
denied her petition until "completion" of surgery.94 This left Frank in gender
transition purgatory, unable to get a name change until she transitioned and unable
to transition without the name change. To this the court added a second
requirement-that Frank get divorced as a prerequisite to the name change. 95 The
court stated, "It would ... be inconsistent for this court to grant the relief requested,
88. See, e.g., Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227 (comparing the sexual habits and history of the trans
defendant and her plaintiff husband with those described in previous trans cases).
89. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Taylor Flynn, The Ties that (Don 'f) Bind: Transgender Family Law and the Un
making ofFamilies, in TRANS GENDER RIGHTS 32, 37-39 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Huang & Shannon
Minter eds., 2006) (discussing dehumanizing, sexist, and heterosexist aspects of courts' hyper
sexualizing inquiries concerning trans claimants' genitalia and sexual relations).
92. See, e.g., id. at 71 (noting that "[w]hi1e the court includes a discussion of [plaintiff's] life
experience with (relative) sensitivity, its exaltation of male penetration of women has the effect of
reducing [plaintiff] to little more than a receptacle for intercourse and her marriage to little more than
the missionary position").
93. See In re Guido, 771 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790-91 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (noting that the court's
previous inquiry into sex-reassignment surgery and the status of the petitioner's marriage was
"misplaced").
94. Id. at 789-91. Trans people who desire surgery typically must undergo a protocol that includes
the so-called "real life test," in which the person must live and work full-time in their identified gender
for one year. In addition to the courts, other "gatekeepers" may include employers, who may insist on a
legal name change before allowing the person to present herself at work in her identified gender. I put
"completion" in quotes to highlight the fact that courts often require mUltiple surgeries to consider
gender reassignment to be complete-surgeries that can be far more extensive, costly, and medically
risky than the treatment a particular trans person deems appropriate for herself.
95. Id. at 790 (quoting the earlier, unpublished order).
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to permit the applicant to appear and represent himself as female, while in fact he
remains in a legal relationship with his wife premised on his being male."96 In an
impressive turnaround (albeit two years later), the same judge overturned her prior
ruling and granted the petition-not because Frank had fulfilled either requirement
(surgeries and divorce), but on the ground that these requirements were beyond the
scope of a name change petition.97 Most importantly, the judge acknowledged that
one function of her prior decision had been to send a message about appropriate
gender roles: "The law does not distinguish between masculine and feminine names
.... Apart from the prevention of fraud or interference with the rights of others,
there is no reason-and no legal basis-for the courts to appoint themselves the
guardians of orthodoxy in such matters."98
III.

ASSIMILATION, DISSENT, AND THE MEDICAL MODEL

This Part examines the tensions at play in a trans person's assertion that state
enforcement of gender conformity over her objection violates her right of free
expression. While there is some reference to the doctrinal argumentation that is the
focus of Part III, my emphasis here is on two highly schematized accounts of
gender non-conformity as expression. Drawing on a tension historically (and I
believe inevitably) at play in generations of civil rights movements, these are
struggles of, respectively, assimilation and resistance. 99 Mapping these broadly
onto gender identity, the first are claims of inclusion, largely within a binarized
understanding of gender. These constitute the bulk of legal challenges-plaintiffs,
typically transsexual, whose claim and/or self-understanding can loosely be
described as one of mis-categorization within the binary.loo The second are claims
for inclusion outside of (and often in resistance to) a binarized understanding of
gender. Not surprisingly, given the law's Aristotelian approach, there are no
equality challenges (to my knowledge) that encompass the latter. As even a
glancing familiarity with expression jurisprudence would suggest, however, an
experience of one's gender identity that is simultaneously an assertion of resistance
has the potential to be characterized as dissent, a value preciously guarded by the
First Amendment.
A. Assimilation and Resistance as Dissent

Although protected expression need be neither political nor a form of dissent,
protection is at its highest for political speech, with the closely related notion that a
primary purpose underlying free expression is the protection of dissent. IOI The
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting prior order). Frank's wife had already submitted
to the court a sworn statement of consent to the name change. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 791.
99. Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 1.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 101-108 (explaining how an individual's resistance against
the binary gender model is an expressive form of dissent).
101. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 507 (1969) (prohibiting states from limiting political
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expression of gender-nonconformity, as a pragmatic matter, is likely to be deemed
too far afield from speech traditionally considered to be "political."102 By contrast,
as suggested by the often hostile and at times viciously violent reactions of others
to an individual's non-conforming gender expression,103 a court could find that this
expression fulfills "a principal 'function of free speech [which] is to invite
dispute[,] ... induce[] a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stir[] people to anger."I04 Gender presumptively positions us in
the world along a variety of axes, including sex, sexuality, and sexual orientation;
its power to invoke a visceral, almost primitive hostility when non-conforming is a
testament to gender's instant messaging of myriad meanings about our place(s) in
the social hierarchy.
Both models posited above can be conceptualized as dissent. Consider a self
understanding that perhaps most closely tracks the dominant view of sex and
gender: a binarized mismatch of sex and gender identity, biological in origin and
medically diagnosable. 105 This is a claim for inclusion arguably at its most
assimilationist. Rather than characterizing the claim as one of resistance, it might
be understood simply as an assertion of belonging. Most trans individuals seek
nothing more (and nothing less) than access to the gender privileges enjoyed and
usually taken for granted by non-trans persons. These privileges can include
having the sex marker on their driver's license or birth certificate reflect their
gender identity or the right to marry in accordance with their identified gender. In
short, what many trans persons seek looks little like dissent: they seek access to
norms and privileges, many of which are accessible only through the state and
which are a prerequisite for individuals to function smoothly in society. Their
claim is one of assimilation and they seek the legitimizing power of the state.
As others have argued, when a member of a marginalized group asserts her
right to be accepted within mainstream norms on an equal basis, that claim for
equality is at once assimilative and an expression of dissent. Discussing occasions
"when [subordinated] groups or identities seek inclusion or equal treatment and are
resisted," Nan Hunter argued that this effort "is intrinsically a move against
orthodoxy because they challenge the patterns of stratification and the ideology of
dominance that undergirds those patterns."106 In short, she asserted, "Claims of
equality based on identities of difference are intrinsically a kind of protest."107

speech unless it is directed at inciting immediate lawless activity).
102. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652,2674 (2007) (describing
election-related advertisements as "pure political speech").
103. See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM SURVEY (2001),
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.orglpdfi'sbac_survey.pdf. I in no way mean to suggest that gender
variant people are somehow "inviting," or are in any other way responsible for the discrimination,
harassment, and violence perpetrated against them.
104. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (alternations and omissions added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949».
105. For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of reliance on a medical model, see infra Part
III.B.
106. Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 1720.
107. Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note I, at 5.
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Although the simultaneity of assimilation and dissent may appear paradoxical, it is
in fact a combination that may augur for success in the courts. Courts may more
readily accept a message of "dissent"-particularly a transsexual's medicalized
claim-precisely because it does not dissent "too much." In other words, the
plaintiffs gender identity in such cases, while non-conforming, is-for better and
for worse--comprehensible to the court because it fits within the mainstream sex
gender rubric.
B. Expression Encompasses Identities that Rely on and Reject a Medical Model

The mainstream understanding of gender non-conformity is often conveyed
via a medicalized model; in court, this typically consists of a claimant's reliance on
a diagnosis of gender identity disorder (GID).108 Whether advocates should rely on
a medical model is hotly contested within the trans community,109 and while I
advert to the arguments briefly, an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article. For my purposes, the most important point is that a First Amendment
approach may provide a greater opportunity for success for cases in which a
medical model is not used and provides the flexibility of reliance on a diagnosis if
that approach is preferred. Because First Amendment claims are predicated on the
expression of views rather than directly based in identity, there is at least less of a
doctrinal (as opposed to pragmatic) drive to prove the underlying "truth" or reality
of one's views. My normative aspiration is for advocates to pursue expression
claims both within and outside of a medical model. As discussed below, the
decision whether to rely on a medical model may depend on a variety of factors,
particularly the individual's level of comfort or disagreement with such a model.
There are significant reasons to be wary of reliance on a medical model,
particularly given that such reliance historically has been a source of oppression for
subordinated groups-the American eugenics movement, Nazism, and the
involuntary sterilization of people of color and/or the poor via welfare programs in
the 1970s are sadly but a partial list. llo Mental health diagnoses, such as

108. See Romeo, supra note 22, 724-30 (discussing the medical model of gender as used by courts
and its reliance of medical evidence, typicaJly in the form of psychiatric diagnosis of GID). See
generally AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-fV] (defining gender identity disorder in children,
adolescents and adults).
109. Compare Spade, supra note 65, at 23-26 (discussing the dangers of the medical model of
transsexuality), with Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), but Gender Identity
Might, 15 COLUM. 1. GENDER & L. 90, 104 (2006) (advocating for bringing disability claims with gender
discrimination claims writing that "[b]y incorporating a medical claim associated with one's gender ...
courts can distance themselves from the particular facts ... and take seriously the dysphoria experienced
by a plaintiff's forced conformity to gender norms.").
110. See, e.g., Buck v. BeJl, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding involuntary sterilization of teenager
claimed to be mentaJly disabled on the ground that "three generations of imbeciles are enough");
Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide:
Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo LJ. I, 4 n.20 (1994) (noting that World War II
provided Nazi Germany with an "opportunity to exterminate, enslave, or Germanize various European
nationalities which were viewed as biological inferiors" (citing RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN
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homosexuality, gender identity disorder, and gender identity disorder in children,
arguably reflect little more than political horse-trading of marginalized identities in
an attempt to enforce gender and sexual orientation conformity. II I Some argue that
reliance on a medical model, particularly as a mental health diagnosis or disability,
embraces and re-inscribes the notion that gender nonconformity is a stigmatic
"sickness" to be "cured."112 Trans people, moreover, are particularly vulnerable,
whether to being kicked out of their homes at a young age, fired from their jobs, or
subject to stranger or intimate violence, resulting in a disproportionate number who
are homeless, living in poverty, or caught in a cycle of sex work for survival
followed by periods of incarceration. ll3 Multiply marginalized, many may not have
access to health care, which some argue is an impediment to reliance on a medical
model. 114 For others, reliance on a medical model does not reflect their lives, as
their gender identities are not experienced as tied to biology or as otherwise
essentialized; moreover, there is a risk that non-essentialized experiences of gender
identity may be devalued or dismissed as inauthentic, particularly against the
backdrop of medicalized claims. liS As discussed below, a claim based in
expression may offer greater potential for success than equality-based claims for
cases in which there is no reliance on a medical model.
There are likewise significant reasons to rely on a medicalized model. For
some, a medical model-whether through a GID diagnosis, experienced as a form
of disability, or simply as biological in etiology-reflects their lived experience. 116

OCCUPIED EUROPE 80-82 (1944»); Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation ofMinorities'"; Race, Ethnicity and
Reactionary Color Blindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 997 (2007) (noting that throughout the 1920s and
into the 1930s courts and legislatures were committed to biological theories of inherent differences
among different races in order to justifY legal oppression).
Ill. See generally PHYLLIS BURKE, THE "PREHOMOSEXUAL" AGENDA 100 (1996) (discussing the
increased use ofGID for children suspected of being gay). By "horse-trading of marginalized identities"
I mean to say that one marginalized identity-being transgender (and being diagnosed as such through
GID)-is replacing another marginalized identity-being gay.
112. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 109, at 104-06 (arguing in favor of the use of disability claims for
trans plaintiffs, but acknowledging the social stigma of being "disabled" as the primary objection to
raising these disability claims); Spade, supra note 65, at 34 (expressing concern that "trans people do not
want to be seen as 'disabled'" because it implies that to be transgendered is to be flawed).
113. See Spade, supra note 65, at 17 n.5 (describing his own experience in witnessing the gravity of
transgender vulnerability).
114. Id. at 35 (arguing that lower income individuals will be denied protections available to wealthier
individuals because they lack the resources necessary to access a GID diagnosis as a "diagnosable
condition," which is necessary when courts utilize the medical model approach). But see Levi, supra
note 109, at 107-08 (arguing in support of adding a disability claim to a gender discrimination claim and
responding to the argument that a medical approach to claims of gender discrimination denies protection
to lower-income individuals by stating that medical diagnosis is not necessary to prove the existence of a
disability in most states).
liS. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 65, at 19-23 (discussing author's experience of his gender identity,
for whom resistance to a medical model is an integral part of his self-understanding, and who had
difficulty accessing medical treatment because of his non-essentialized gender identity).
116. I do not mean to argue that a medical model necessarily entails agreement with, or reliance on a
disability model; what they share in common is some degree of reliance on a medical or biologized
understanding of gender non-conformity.
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One of my fonner transsexual clients, for example, is hearing impaired; in his self
understanding, both his deafness and transsexualism are experienced as
biologically-based and as disabilities.117 In his view, "disability" simply refers to
variances from the nonn that may (or may not) require accommodation by those
within the nonn, and he urges that the tenn be embraced by those who so identify:
"The most disabling part of a disability," he said, "is other people's reactions to it,
so I have no problem relying on disability anti-discrimination laws; I want to take
the stigma out of the tenn 'disability,' rather than reject it because it is
stigmatizing."1l8 Others have made similar arguments in the context of the
language and jurisprudential interpretations of disability nondiscrimination laws. 119
Another reason, most likely the primary drive towards reliance on a medical model,
is that it can assist a court in comprehending the nature of the hann of enforced
confonnity to gender nonns-a hann that that may otherwise be unrecognizable or
devalued by a judge for whom such confonnity comes seamlessly, with no
discemable cost and no experience of hann. Jennifer Levi, for instance, argued that
litigation wins for trans sex discrimination claims owe their success to the
introduction of medical evidence that enabled the court to understand the deeply
rooted nature of gender identity and provided the "judge a basis for removing ...
herself as the evaluator of the hann,"120 making it possible for the judge to more
fully comprehend "the sincere reasons why the plaintiff could not confonn to a sex
differentiated dress requirement."121
Consider first an expression challenge relying upon a GID diagnosis. Doe ex
reI. Doe v. Yunits,122 one of the few cases to consider an expression claim,
demonstrates the potential for success. Pat Doe, a trans teenage girl, designated
male at birth and diagnosed with gender identity disorder, was effectively
prohibited from enrolling in the eighth grade if she wore "girls' clothing or
accessories" to school. 123 Undertaking a traditional symbolic speech analysis on a
motion to dismiss, the court determined that there was a likelihood of success on
the merits, given that testimony at trial would likely establish that her message was
one of gender nonconfonnity.124 The court concluded, "[T]here is strong evidence
that plaintiffs message is well understood by faculty and students. The school's
vehement response and some students' hostile reactions are proof of the fact that
the plaintiffs message clearly has been received."125

117. Phone conversation with my fonner client, who requests anonymity (Jan. 30, 2009).
118. Id.
.
119. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 109, at 105-107 (arguing, inter alia, that the legal meaning of
"disability" in non-discrimination laws describes a health condition that does not preclude an individual
from performing the essential elements of a job with or without accommodation, and that many such
laws provide a cause of action for persons "regarded as" disabled, even ifnot in fact disabled).
120. Id. at 104.
121. Id.atlOI.
122. No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199.
123. Id. at *1-2.
124. Id. at *3-4.
125. Id. at *4.
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The Yunits court was strongly influenced-maybe even moved-by the
fundamental role that gender identity plays in our lives. It is evident, moreover,
that the court came to its understanding of the integral nature of gender identity
based, at least in part, on the diagnosing therapist's testimony.126 The court made
multiple references to the therapist's testimony, focusing in particular on the
evidence that expression of Pat' s l27 gender identity is essential to her health and
well-being. 128 While I urge that claims also be brought without reliance on a
medical model-and argue that First Amendment may be particularly well-suited
for such claims where appropriate-the Yunits opinion suggests that clinical
evidence can help judges understand that gender expression is, in the court's words,
integral to an individual's "selfhood"129 and "a necessary symbol of [one's] very
identity."I3O
Now consider, for instance, Dean Spade's description-which, importantly, is
not a description in any static, binarized sense-of his gender identity. In
discussing his difficulty accessing chest reconstruction surgery, Spade explained
that the medical community's resistance was in reaction to his rejection of an
essentialized identity and his refusal to be identified within that paradigm. 131 Spade
explained, "The fact that I don't want to change my first name, that I haven't
sought out the use of the pronoun 'he,' that I don't think that 'lesbian' is the wrong
word for me, or, worse yet, that I recognize that the use of any word for myself
lesbian, transperson, transgender butch, boy, mister, FTM fag, butch-has always
been/will always be strategic, is my undoing in their eyes."132 Spade's experience
of his gender fits relatively neatly into jurisprudential protection of expression, as
his self-understanding is inextricably bound with opposition to the canonical
account. Paradoxically, while the highly politicized and strategic nature of his self
understanding may make his expression more of a piece with that traditionally
safeguarded by the First Amendment, it is precisely these qualities that may, as a
pragmatic matter, result in rejection of protection by courts.
Imagine Spade's statement within the symbolic speech rubric employed in
Yunits. There is no real dispute that he had the intent to convey a particularized
message, one of the two principal elements of symbolic speech.133 The question is

126. Id. at *3.
127. While this Article typically refers to plaintiffs by their last names, because "Doe" is a rather
ubiquitous and hence more impersonal pseudonym, I refer to the plaintiff in Doe v. Yunits by her
pseudonymous first name, "Pat."
128. See, e.g., id. at *1 ("Plaintiffs treating therapist ... determined that it was medically and
clinically necessary for plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with the female gender and that failure to do
so could cause harm to plaintiffs mental health."); id. at *3 ("[P]laintiffs ability to express herself and
her gender identity through dress is important to her health and well-being.").
129. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Spade, supra note 65, at 21.
132. Id. Spade now uses male pronouns and no longer uses his given first name. See id. at 19 n.14.
FTM is an abbreviation for "female-to-male."
133. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (finding that in determining whether conduct is sufficiently
"communicative" the two principal elements are "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
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whether there was a great likelihood that the message was understood,134 given the
arguable complexity of his expression. Case law, however, provides that the focus
is simply on whether the overall theme or meaning of the expression as a whole is
understood, rather than its particularities. \35 In this case, one need not ever have
heard the terms "trans gender butch" or "FTM fag," or understand that Spade's
inclusion of terms related to sexual attraction is an indicator of a multi-dimensional
understanding of gender; all that needs to be understood is the primary message of
gender non-conformity.136 As an initial matter, then, Spade's expression seems to
be (and I would argue that it is) exactly the kind of symbolic expression that best
serves the First Amendment's "high purpose" by inviting dispute and hence worthy
of protection. 137
A primary obstacle faced by persons who experience their gender identity as
grounded in opposition to the sex-gender paradigm, however, is the risk that courts
may overlook precisely that which made Yunits successful-the court's
understanding that the plaintiffs gender identity is a deeply felt and integral aspect
of one's "selfuood."\38 In contrast with a medicalized account of gender, a court
may dismiss the harm to Spade by discounting his experience as "mere" expression
(cast, perhaps, as disruptive rebelliousness) rather than recognize that, as with Pat
Doe, the harm to Spade is equally profound. This is due to the Ubiquity of the
binarized, essentialized view of gender: that view is so widespread that it becomes
canonical. As a result, a judge may be unable to recognize that her beliefs about
gender are simply that-beliefs-a partial and incomplete view of gender rather
than the sum total of gender itself. \39 I do not believe this will be fatal in all cases,
however, particularly over time. Importantly, Spade's gender expression, in which

present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it" (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (\974»); see also infra notes 140
145 (discussing symbolic speech more in depth).
134. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
135. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (\995)
(finding that the message disfavored by parade organizers-that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or
bisexual-was a "collective point" inherent in the "expressiveness of marching"); Yunits, 2000 WL
33162199, at *4 (finding that the plaintiff's fellow students would likely understand the plaintiff's
overall message: that she was more comfortable wearing clothes consistent with her female gender
identity).
136. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568; see infra notes 149-158.
137. Johnson, 491 U.S at 408-09 (quoting Terminiel/o, 337 U.S. at 4).
138. See Yuntis, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 ("This court cannot allow the stifling of plaintiffs
selfuood merely because it causes some members of the community discomfort.").
139. See Barbara 1. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See"; White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (\993) (discussing what the author
terms the "transparency phenomenon," in which white persons' race is experienced as invisible to them
because it is the presumed racial norm); see also Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and Gender, I INT'L
J. CONST. L. 663, 669 (2003) (noting that gender is a social construct and that social gender identity,
resulting from this construct, is a product of the norms of behavior of men and women as defined by
culture and religion); supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing how trans identity is based
on being different from common understandings of gender norms, which begs the question as to what
the norm is).
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dissent from the norm is an integral part of his gender identity, directly implicates
core First Amendment values.
For my part, my normative aspiration is for advocates to pursue claims both
within and outside of a medical model. Given the widespread resistance to and
reactiveness against gender variance, the vast majority of gender identity claims by
trans individuals are unsuccessful; neither form of expression challenge is likely to
change that course any time soon. All expression claims, but perhaps particularly
those that directly reject a medical, binarized model may in the long-run serve a
powerful purpose: chipping away at the dominant view of gender. Counsel must
take care not to bring claims at the expense of the client by failing, for example, to
make clear the barriers to success. But throughout social movements, individuals,
particularly when represented by advocacy organizations, have recognized the
value of taking the long view where civil rights and liberties are concerned. My
hope is not only that some expression claims will succeed, but also that the act of
bringing such claims over time will increase informed public understanding
conceming the multi-faceted aspects of gender identity and the harms of state
enforced gender orthodoxy.
IV.

LAWYERS' WORK: SYMBOLIC AND COMPELLED EXPRESSION

In this Part, I address some of the doctrine-wrangling that is an inevitable
component of expression claims, examining challenges based on symbolic and
compelled expression. Both claims present significant challenges. I argue that
they are important to bring nonetheless, because both accurately reflect the real life
experience of many trans persons. The first-suppression based on the state's
disagreement with the gender message expressed-is most likely to arise in the
context of education and employment. The second-compelled expression and the
forced disclosure of one's identity-is most likely to arise in the context of sex
designations in government documentation over the individual's objection.
Although there have been a handful of claims made on the former basis, I am not
aware of any based on the latter. Again, assuming that the potential litigant is fully
informed that such claims face (to put it mildly) an uphill battle in the courts, I
argue that they are worth bringing. Both challenges articulate the nature of the
injury that many persons currently endure in silence.
A. Symbolic Expression

Although the First Amendment has long protected a wide range of symbolic
conduct, it is unsurprising that symbolic expression doctrine incorporates numerous
gatekeepers, lest every form of conduct that has expressive implications (a political
assassination, for instance) be protected by the First Amendment. Because the
framework for making a symbolic expression claim is fairly straightforward, this
Subsection focuses on three such gatekeepers: the assertion that the audience is
unlikely to have understood plaintiffs message; the determination that the state's
action was not aimed at suppressing expression; and the protection afforded
employers and schools with respect to grooming and dress restrictions.
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1. Gender as a Message Instantly Sent and Received
Return for a moment to Pat Doe in Yunits, who made a symbolic speech
claim.140 Pat's expression of her gender identity (through means including wearing
skirts, jewelry, and other accessories deemed feminine) is not that different from
symbolic expression already protected by the Supreme Court, such as wearing a
black armband 141 or flag patch on the seat of one's jeans. 142 In those cases, the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of protecting views which may make
others uncomfortable or angry, as well as the First Amendment's role in guarding
against state-enforced efforts to coerce conformity.143 Under a symbolic speech
analysis, a court must determine whether the claimant had "[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message" and whether there is a great likelihood that the message
"would be understood by those who viewed it."l44 As mentioned in Part III, the
Yunits court found, with little apparent difficulty, that Pat was likely to succeed at
establishing both elements at trial. 145 Before proceeding further, however, I would
like to briefly address the contention made by the state in Yunits, and likely to be
encountered in any symbolic expression challenge, that the plaintiffs message was
not specific enough and that it was not understood. 146
In contrast to wearing a black armband as a war protest, which has a relatively
specific, pre-defined meaning, messages sent through gender expression may be
complex. Was Pat, for instance, sending a message that she's female? Or
trans gender? Or merely rebellious? As noted in Part II, similar questions may be
even more likely to arise with respect to persons whose gender identities are non
binarized (and therefore arguably less familiar to the general public).147 Such
arguments are particularly likely in a school setting, given the young age of the
students. The school in Yunits seized on this potential for complexity, as well as
the students' youth, to argue that the students did not understand the complicated
nature of gender identity. 148

140. See supra text accompanying notes 122- 130 (discussing a trans teenage girl, designated male at
birth and diagnosed with gender identity disorder, who was effectively prohibited from enrolling in the
eighth grade if she wore "girls' clothing or accessories" to school).
141. Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
142. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974).
143. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 ("Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble ...
[and any] variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. ... But our Constitution says we must
take this risk ... and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness
that is the basis of our national strength ... [to] grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society." (citing Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4».
144. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
145. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing court's conclusion that "plaintiff's
message clearly has been received").
146. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4.
147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Dean Spade's declaration of his gender
identity as an acceptance of a multitude of descriptors along intersecting axes of sex/gender and sexual
orientation).
148. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4.
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The responses to this are at once doctrinal and pragmatic. The Supreme Court
has determined that an overall message may be undeniably comprehensible even
when not every component of the message is clearly communicated. 149 In the day
to-day world, this conclusion is a sensible one. Consider Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group ofBoston, ISO in which the Court upheld a Saint
Patrick's Day parade organizer's exclusion of an openly-gay Irish American
organization from the contingents of marchers, despite a state law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 151 Even when there are smaller, and
seemingly disparate pieces to a message-in Hurley, for instance, contingents ran
the gamut from Miss Ice-O-Rama to "McGruff the Crime Dog"IS2-the Court's
statement that "though the score may not produce a particularized message, each
contingent's expression in the [organizer's] eyes comports with what merits
celebration on that day"IS3 seems to be spot on. In Hurley, the overall message
("what merits celebration") was clearly expressed by the organizer's choice of that
which it determined did not merit celebration. 154
Even though consideration of the individual components of the parade
organizer'S message was not easily comprehensible, the message expressed by
excluding the openly-gay contingent is undeniable. The contingent consisted of
people marching behind a banner that read, quite simply, "Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston."15S This assertion of identity-much like
the sandwich boards straightforwardly stating, "I AM A MAN"-is at once
disarming in its simplicity and militarizing in its unvarnished demand for equality.
As the majority in Hurley recognized,
[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at
least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or
bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest
their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much
claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals ....156
In gender expression cases, the "particularized message" likewise need not
rise to the level of conveying a sophisticated understanding of gender identity or
the more subtle aspects of an individual's identification.1S7 Instead, the message
typically conveyed is simple, direct, and one we are attuned to immediately
recognize. As in Hurley or as with the statements "I AM A MAN," or "Ain't I a

149. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
150. 515 U.S. 557.
151. [d. at 573-75.
152. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1296
n.9 (Mass. 1994).
153. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
154. [d.
155. [d. at 570.
156. Id. at 574.
157. For an example of more nuanced understandings of trans identities, see supra text
accompanying notes 25-49.
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Woman," the statement in gender expression cases is one of identity. 158 Pat Doe,
for instance, was asserting, "I'm female," a message that is gender non
conforming. 159 Trained as we are from an early age to categorize people as boys
and girls, our reading of gender-and particularly gender variance-happens at the
speed of light: instant messaging. As researchers explain, this process is automatic:
When we come upon a person, many features of the target are
rapidly encoded-size and shape, facial features and expression,
clothing, and more. These features and the inferences drawn
from them, allow, even require, perceivers to make quick
assessments .... Among the most basic of such "person" features
that are automatically communicated is a person's gender .... 160
Returning to the school's arguments in Yunits, while onlooking students may
never have heard the term "transgender" or be familiar with the complexities of
gender identity, the eighth grader was not attempting to convey an understanding of
the intricacies of gender identity; she was simply communicating her identity as
female. 161 Significantly, it was not skirt or bra-wearing to which the school
objected-students designated female at birth could wear these items as a matter of
course. 162 Instead, much like the "I AM A MAN" sandwich boards worn by
sanitation workers (all, crucially, male), it is the juxtaposition of the sign-whether
sandwich board or skirt-in conjunction with the bearer's presumed anatomical sex
that creates the message that is instantaneously sent and received. As discussed in
greater detail in Part III, moreover, the state attempted to compel a counter
message-a sign that in effect reads, "I'm male," expressed through the coerced
wearing of pants as a condition of attending school. I63
Especially in school settings, the government is likely to make the nested
argument that even if plaintiffs message is understood, it is disruptive; in addition,
the government may attempt to re-characterize gender expression as inappropriate
sexual conduct. 164 As I have argued elsewhere, trans people, like those in other

158. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (commenting that GLIB wanted to participate in the parade "in
order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish
immigrants").
159. See, e.g., Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (describing expression and identity of student at
issue).
160. Kristi M. Lemm et aI., Gender Picture Priming: It Works with Denotative and Connotative
218, 219 (2005), available at http://www.atypon
Primes, 23 SOCIAL COGNITION
link.com/GPI/doiJabs/10.1521/soco.2005.23.3.218 (follow "View PDF article" hyperlink).
161. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see discussion supra Part I1I.B (discussing facts of Yunits).
164. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (stating school officials argued that a
student held banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" was disruptive because it promoted illegal drug
use); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-05 (presenting school official's argument that students' wearing of
armbands as symbols of objection to conflict in Vietnam constituted a disturbance of school discipline);
Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4-5.
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marginalized groups, are hyper-sexualized.!65 Judicial opinions are replete with the
fetishizing of trans individuals, typically adults; given the social anxiety about
"protecting" children from sexual minorities and the school's judicially accepted
role in instilling values, the risk of such conflation is presumably even greater in
the context ofminors.!66 To the extent possible, I suggest confronting these issues
in advance-perhaps in the complaint's discussion of gender identity (for example,
by distinguishing it from punishable lewd conduct and by emphasizing the
fundamental nature of gender identity to all persons); the Yunits opinion does a nice
job of making these distinctions in an accessible manner.!67
2. Aiming at (and Devaluing) Expression
It is likely that the following quote from the Supreme Court's opinion from
United States v. 0 'Brien!68 will appear prominently in any state briefing, whether in

an education or employment setting: "We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."!69 Given the necessity of line
drawing, this statement is seductive. 0 'Brien itself, however, is cautionary. With
the first two prongs!70 of the Court's test for symbolic expression met-David
O'Brien sent, and there was a great likelihood that onlookers understood, the
message expressed by the burning of his draft card on the courthouse steps-the
Court asked whether the government's action was "directed at the communicative
nature of [the] conduct,"!7! and rather facilely determined that it was not. 172 A
response in the negative serves a sorting function by reducing rather dramatically
(in effect, if not in articulation) the standard of review, all but ensuring that the
state's action will be upheld.!73

165. See Flynn, supra note 91, at 37-39 (discussing hyper-sexualization of transgender claimants).
166. See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dis!., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1092-93 (E.D. Cal. 200 I) (involving a student-led organization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
and heterosexual students and the hostile environment created by teachers and administrators of the
school district); Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (evaluating school officials' argument that
transgender student's choice of attire was disrupting to other students); see also Anthony Niedwiecki &
William E. Adams, Jr., Introduction, The Florida Example, 32 NOVA L. REv. 515, 516-17 (2006)
(presenting Anita Bryant's arguments against homosexuality that focused primarily on preventing harm
to children).
167. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *5.
168. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
169. !d. at 376; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (acknowledging this language from O'Brien as part
of the protected expression analysis).
170. The first two prongs are whether there was "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message" and
whether there is a great likelihood that the message "would be understood by those who viewed it."
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
171. ld. at 406.
172. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. For instance, the Supreme Court accepted at face value the
government's assertion that the draft card itself served an important government function in the
administration of the draft, even though one could be inducted if the card itself was lost. ld. at 377-78.
173. While the language of the standard to be applied when a court fmds that the government's action
was not aimed at expression appears to be strong-for instance the incidental restriction on an
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As arguably occurred in 0 'Brien, a court that devalues the expression at issue
can fairly easily find that the government's action was not aimed at expression
simply by adopting the government's articulated reason for its suppression. In
gender expression cases, the best counterarguments are likely to be educational and
factual. Concerning the former, the most important education for the court is for
plaintiffs to convey the fundamental nature of gender expression and its centrality
to one's well-being. Concerning the latter, it is rarely the case that the state is
implementing a pre-existing policy; rather, it is more likely that an employer or
school administrator has created an impromptu, one-of-a-kind policy in direct
response to the plaintiffs non-conforming gender expression. Even if the
government can point to a longstanding sex-differentiated dress code, its
application to the plaintiff is usually far from evenhanded. The school district's
reaction in Doe v. Yunits is illustrative. The district required Pat (and only Pat) to
submit to daily clothing checks before being permitted to attend class, and
subsequently implemented a policy prohibiting her from wearing girls' clothing or
accessories. 174 The school district argued that it was impartially enforcing its
prohibition of disruptive conduct. 175 Even assuming that the district would apply
the same policy to others designated male at birth, however, it remains a policy
aimed at non-conforming gender expression. As the court noted, those designated
as female are permitted to wear the same items considered contraband for students
deemed to be male. 176
3. The "Appearance" Cases
While the law has long protected a wide range of symbolic conduct, it
routinely denies First Amendment protection to a subset of symbolic expression in
the so-called "appearance cases," those challenging grooming or dress
restrictions. 177 In the appearance cases, courts have sometimes undertaken the
symbolic speech analysis above, but most frequently have circumvented it. 178 In
Kelley v. Johnson,179 for instance, the Supreme Court rejected an officer's challenge
to the police department's hair and sideburn length regulations, discussing First
Amendment concerns only briefly.180 The majority opinion focused solely on the

individual's First Amendment rights must be "no greater than is essential," O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, in
practice this standard has been applied deferentially. For a critique of a 'Brien, see Pinard v. Clatskani
School District 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 759 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006), declining to apply O'Brien finding it
inapplicable in the Ninth Circuit with regards to school uniform cases. See also, e.g., Keith Werhan,
The O'Briening ojFree Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 635 (1987) (criticizing the application
of the a 'Brien test to situations outside of its initially intended and narrow scope of application).
174. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at ·2.
175. Id. at ·4.
176. Id.
177. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (briefly discussing First Amendment issues);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08 (briefly discussing the expression related to dress and appearance).
178. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245 (focusing on power to regulate state employees); Tinker, 393 U.S. at
507-08 (focusing on the need to maintain order and limit disruptive behavior in schools).
179. 425 U.S. 238.
180. Id. at 245. The Supreme Court primarily addressed the officer's Due Process claim, which the
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state's power to regulate government employees' speech, without undertaking any
analysis of the expression at issue-in fact, the message sent by the plaintiff was
apparently so inconsequential to the Court that it never even mentioned what
message the officer claimed he was expressing-gender non-conformity? affiliation
with the youth counter-culture movement? religious belief? fashion? I 81 Similarly,
the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines l82 protected the right of students to
wear black armbands, but in an undeveloped analysis distinguished those facts
from the "regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, ... hair style, or
deportment."183 While not commenting further, the Court cited, with apparent
favor, a Fifth Circuit decision that denied a First Amendment claim by male
students who had been prohibited from enrolling in school because of their
"Beatles" type haircuts. 184 The Court has not elaborated on the distinction, but
implicit in its reasoning is a devaluing of appearance expression as unworthy of
heightened First Amendment solicitude.
As a robust body of scholarship has emphasized, appearance cases may
implicate the expression of deeply-held identities, including those based on race,
gender, sexual orientation, and religion. 18s The appearance cases, however,
systematically devalue appearance as a mode of expression, despite-and perhaps
because of-its centrality in our lives. As Karl Klare and others have noted,
"[J]udges create a peculiar dissonance by trivializing appearance claims while at
the same time asserting the need for the authorities to possess vast powers to
enforce conventional attitudes and prejudices."186 The apparent paradox is easily
explained. As their emphasis on the need of employers to enforce an orderly
learning or work environment suggests, judges seem to realize the power of
appearance expression to cause upset, disagreement, or tension. Trivializing
appearance, then, serves two purposes: it allows the Court to avoid possible
disruption and to maintain formal adherence to First Amendment principles-both
without requiring the Court to make the difficult commitment of allowing potential
disputes to arise.

Court likewise rejected. Ed. at 249.
181. Ed. at 247 (focusing analysis on "the county's method of organizing its police force, and the
promotion of safety of persons and property").
182. 393 U.S. 503.
183. Ed. at 507-08.
184. Ed. at 508 (citing FerreIl v. DaIlas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697,701 (5th Cir. 1968».
185. See. e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255-56 (1989) (holding that sex
discrimination was demonstrated by employer's suggestion, inter alia, that female employee dress more
femininely to be considered for partnership position); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d
1104, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that grooming policy of forcing female employees at
casino to wear makeup did not constitute sex or gender discrimination); MarshaIl v. District of
Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D.D.C. 1975) (rejecting argument that police department
requireme!lt that officers be clean-shaven and have short hair infringed officer's First Amendment right
to the free exercise of religion based on his religious vow not to cut his hair or shave his beard).
186. Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv.
1395, 1401 (1992) (citing Mary Whisner, Comment, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in
Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 74 (1982».
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The function served by the trivialization of appearance claims is evident, for
example, in New Rider v. Board of Education. 187 The Tenth Circuit was able to
ignore the school board's censorship of the students' expression of their Native
American identity, as well as the political message inherent in their assertion of
pride and equality, by characterizing the regulation as one that was simply about
hair length, devoid of expressive meaning or impact. 188 In their dissent from the
denial of certiorari, Justices Douglas and Marshall asserted that the students'
message of "their pride in being Indian" was akin to pure speech, presaging the
Court's recognition three decades later that an assertion of pride in gay and lesbian
identity is expressive. 189 By taking seriously the message expressed by the
students, Douglas and Marshall shifted the focus to the State's use of its power to
censor, referring to the school board's regulation as a "coercive assimilation
policy"190 and an impermissible "effort to impose uniformity."191 While the
significance of the students' speech in New Rider was evident to Justices Douglas
and Marshall, the plaintiffs failed to convince the Court that the issue warranted
Supreme Court review, just as the police officer in Kelley was unable to convince
the Court that his expression through hair length warranted First Amendment
protection. 192 Although trans plaintiffs certainly face an uphill battle, those who are
able to convey to the court the fundamental nature of gender identity and its
centrality to our health and well-being may be able to succeed where other so
called "appearance" claimants have failed.
B. Compelled Expression

Just as the First Amendment protects the right to speak, it also protects the
right to refrain from speaking. This does not mean that the government can never
compel speech. It does so routinely, for example, by requiring citizens to speak
through the filing of tax forms or court documents. But the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence has created a zone of protection for an individual's "sphere of
intellect and spirit"193 by prohibiting compelled "affirmation of a private belief [or]
attitude ofmind."194 While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,
I argue that when a state requires trans people to express a particular gender over
their objection, it may in some instances constitute compelled expression of an idea
with which they vehemently disagree.

187. 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
188. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698 (reaffirming holding in earlier case which "explicitly held that the
wearing of long hair is not akin to pure speech" (citing Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir.
1971))).
189. New Rider, 414 U.S. at 1099 (Douglas, 1., dissenting); see Hurley, SIS U.S. at 574
(acknowledging the expressive elements of identity).
190. New Rider, 414 U.S. at 1103.
191. Id. at 1101.
192. [d. at 1099.
193. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
194. [d. at 633.
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Consider Wooley v. Maynard,195 which involved a fonn of expression about
which many of us would never give a second thought-Mr. Maynard's right to
cover the words "Live Free or Die" on his New Hampshire license plate. 196 The
Supreme Court recognized that an individual's First Amendment interests are more
deeply implicated if compulsion occurs on a repeated basis, and emphasized that
the infringement caused by compelling Mr. Maynard to express a message with
which he disagreed was more severe because of the ongoing nature of automobile
use. 197 Calling Maynard's car a "mobile billboard" for the government, the Court
stated, "[W]e are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of
his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable."198
Since, for the majority of persons, gender identity is congruent with our sex as
designated at birth, most of us likewise do not give compelled gender expression a
second thought. Just as Mr. Maynard was required to express the state's message
as a pre-condition for the routine use of his car, so trans people are required to
express the state's sex-gender message as a pre-condition for engaging in a
multitude of transactions that make up daily life. When the state requires that a
student or one of its employees adhere to appearance standards based on that
person's sex assigned at birth, she must spend eight hours a day interacting with her
classmates or colleagues expressing a gender identity with which she deeply
disagrees. Similarly, if the state prohibits changing the sex marker on a trans
person's driver's license, she must express a gender message she opposes each time
she engages in everyday transactions, such as opening a bank account, securing
employment, purchasing alcohol or items by credit card, cashing a check, or
responding to a traffic stop by the police. 199 In such situations, it is the trans person
herself who has become the "mobile billboard" for the state's expression of its
gender orthodoxy.
One jurisprudential obstacle trans plaintiffs may encounter is the Supreme
Court's distinction in Wooley between the use of government mottos (such as "In
God We Trust," on American currency) from the one on Mr. Maynard's license
plate. The Court suggested that the fonner do not pose constitutional concerns
because the purpose of state seals "is not to advertise the message it bears but
simply to authenticate the document by showing the authority of its origin."20o In

195. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
196. [d.
197. !d. at 715.
198. [d.
199. I am not arguing that the state is categorically prohibited from including sex markers on
identification documents. It is likely that the state's interests (such as record-keeping, affirmative action
programs, etc.) are sufficiently strong to allow it to record a sex designation, but that the interest fails in
those circumstances in which the government insists on a particular sex marker over an individual's
objection. It is not clear what potential remedies may be required by the First Amendment-the easiest
resolution in the vast majority of cases is simply to utilize the sex designation with which the person
identifies.
200. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 n.11.
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trans cases, the State may argue that the purpose of a sex designation in a birth
certificate or driver's license is not to advertise a message, but to accurately
identifY the individual. The State's position would be that the gender marker does
not constitute expression and is merely the recordation of a fact. As discussed in
Part II, however, the state is engaged in expression: it has selected one particular
view of sex-as immutably fixed by one's birth designation-ignoring the large
body of evidence demonstrating that gender identity (rather than genitalia) is the
primary determinant of sex.201
The message of a state motto such as that found on currency, moreover, is far
removed from whatever the item's purpose may be (for example, to purchase
goods). The Court in Wooley distinguished the use of a motto on a license plate
from currency by emphasizing that a license plate motto is more likely to be
associated with the car's owner because of an owner's frequent, personal, and
public use of her car, whereas "currency ... is passed from hand to hand ... and
need not be displayed to the public."202 Identification documents, in contrast, are
uniquely associated with their bearer: their central purpose, in fact, is to identifY the
individual to the world. Documents such as a driver's license, moreover, must
frequently be displayed to members of the public as a pre-condition to engaging in
many transactions that constitute part of daily life. 203
Finally, trans plaintiffs may be able to draw on the Supreme Court's
anonymous speech cases. The Court has consistently struck down prohibitions on
anonymous speech (such as leafleting), as well as state attempts to compel public
disclosure of the identity of members of organizations (such as the NAACP) that
are engaged in expression. 204 Calling anonymity "a shield from the tyranny of the

201. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82 (discussing an insistence on a fixed, essentialized
view that one's gender at birth is one's gender throughout life).
202. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.l5.
203. Given the purpose of identity documents, the state is likely to assert its interest in preventing
fraud. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting free exercise challenge to assignment of
social security number based in part on state's interest in fraud prevention). Notably, however, the
Supreme Court in Bowen ruled that there was no government compulsion in that case, emphasizing that
assignment of the social security number was for the state's internal use, and distinguishing instances of
compelled speech. ld. at 704-06. As discussed supra at notes 197-199, trans claimants have a strong
argument that the government is engaging in direct compulsion of expression, similar to New
Hampshire's insistence that Mr. Wooley express "Live Free or Die" whenever he would drive his car.
Reliance on fraud prevention is further undercut by the ability to change the sex designation on many
state and federal documents, combined with the less intrusive alternative of prohibiting fraud directly.
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (applying exacting scrutiny,
the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960) (overturning ordinance forbidding the distribution of any handbills in
any place under any circumstances if the handbills did not contain the name and address of the person
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it).
204. See, e.g., Mclntyre, 514 U.S. 334 (prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. at 63 (overturning ordinance forbidding the distribution of any handbills
in any place under any circumstances if the handbills did not contain the name and address of the person
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960)
(holding that ordinance requiring disclosure and publication of NAACP membership lists violated the
NAACP members' freedom of association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
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majority," the Court emphasized the crucial role served by protecting the right to
refuse to disclose one's identity when leafleting or as a member of a private (and
typically unpopular) organization. 205 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,206
a 1995 decision striking down a ban on anonymous campaign literature, the Court
stated, "[Anonymous speech] exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights,
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant
society."207 Although political speech was at issue in McIntyre, the Court made
clear that the motivation underlying an individual's refusal to disclose her identity
need not be expressly political; it may be "motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as
much of one's privacy as possible."208 A trans person may be able to successfully
argue that by requiring her identification to indicate her designated birth sex when
it conflicts with her gender expression, the state is forcing her to disclose an
unpopular identity that may subject her to harassment, discrimination, and violence.
V.

PINK ON PINK: NON-TRANS IDENTIFIED CLAIMANTS AND THE INVISIBILITY OF
COERCED EXPRESSION

It may at first seem paradoxical that gender claims (whether based in equality
or expression) by non-trans plaintiffs at times fare worse than those by persons who
are trans-identified. Consider a situation that one might believe is precisely the
kind of harm that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Actz°9 would capture-an
employer's insistence that women conform to traditional gender role stereotypes as
a condition of employment. In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating CO.,2IO the
employer required female employees to undergo a makeover (with extensive
requirements for make-up application, along with hair teasing and styling) and then
held them "accountable," in essence, to their makeover photo through daily
appearance checks; male employees were subject to minimal grooming standards
(consisting of trimmed hair and nails) and were not required to conform daily to a
makeover photo. 211 The Ninth Circuit-which had been the first federal court of
appeals to apply a gender role stereotyping rationale, albeit in dicta, to a trans
person's claim of gender discrimination 212-rejected Darlene Jespersen's claim,

(1958) (holding that because the State failed to show a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on
the freedom to associate, which disclosure of the membership lists was likely to have, the immunity
from state scrutiny of membership lists, which the association claimed on behalf of its members, was so
related to the right of the members to associate freely with others, it was well within the protection of
Fourteenth Amendment).
205. McIntyre, 514 U.s. at 357.
206. 514 U.S. 334.
207. Id. at 357.
208. Id. at 341-42.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2006).
210. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), ajJ'd en bane, 444 F.3d 1104.
21 I. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076.
212. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling Gender Motivated Violence Act
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twice, in its panel opinion213 and subsequently in a rehearing en banc. 214 Unmoved
by Jespersen's claim of harm-she testified that it made her feel "dolled up" and
objectified, interfering so greatly with her ability to perform her job that she felt
compelled to quit-and arguments that the requirements imposed on female
employees were far more burdensome, the court ruled that although the burdens
imposed were "different," they were not "unequal."215
The majorities in both the Ninth Circuit's panel and en banc opinions appear
to have been unable to take seriously the harm experienced by Jespersen, even
though she quit her job of many years, for which she had consistently received
glowing recommendations. 216 The court stated, "This is not a ... requirement ...
tending to stereotype women as sex objects."217 Instead, the court dismissed
Jespersen's degradation as mere idiosyncrasy, concluding, "The only evidence in
the record to support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen's own subjective reaction
to the makeup requirement."218 The impediment for the court, I argue, is that make
up wearing for women is so ubiquitous-such a part of the background-that its
coerced expression, along with its power to objectify, are rendered invisible. As
the dissent noted, "If you are used to wearing makeup--as most American women
are-this may seem like no big deal."219 The majority appears unable to
conceptualize make-up wearing as subordinating precisely because it is something
that many of their wives, daughters, sisters, mothers (or, if female, perhaps
themselves) wear routinely. The majority, in effect, is trying to read pink lettering
against a pink background.
The notion of losing sight of ubiquitous norms is a familiar one in critical race
theory. Barbara Flagg, for example, discussed what she calls the "transparency
phenomenon," in which white people do not view themselves in racialized terms
because "whiteness" is the prevailing paradigm.220 The Second Circuit addressed
the notion of the legibility of prevailing norms in a case evocative of a contrived
law school hypothetical-a situation in which a female plaintiff wanted to conform
to gender norms, but the government would not let her. 22I In Zalewska v. County of
Sullivan,222 Grazyna Zalewska, who had never worn pants at any time during her
life, was a van driver required to wear pants; the state argued that it instituted the
requirement in part because pants were less likely to get caught in the van's
chairlift mechanism.223 After having been told that no exception to the uniform

applicable to trans plaintiff by analogy to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which court reasoned
applies to claims by trans individuals).
213. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1083.
214. Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104.
215. [d. at 1106.
216. [d. at 1117-18 (Kosinski, J., dissenting).
217. [d. at 1112 (majority opinion).
218. !d.
219. [d. at 1117-18 (Kosinski, J., dissenting).
220. Flagg, supra note 139, at 957.
221. Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003).
222.316F.3d314.
223. [d. at3l7-18.
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policy would be made for her, Zalewska nonetheless specially ordered a
customized uniform with a skirt; when her employer ordered her to return the skirt,
she refused. 224 She was suspended for insubordination and ultimately was
involuntarily transferred; she filed a claim alleging, inter alia, violation of her right
of expression under the First Arnendrnent.22S
The Second Circuit rejected the employee's claim, reasoning that her message
was not understood because it was not sufficiently particularized. 226 Why was her
message lacking in specificity? Because, the court reasoned, Zalewska wanted to
conform to gender norms, and gender conformity fails to send a message that
others are likely to notice or understand: "[I]t is difficult to see how [the
employee's] broad message would be readily understood by those viewing her
since no particularized communication can be divined simply from a woman
wearing a skirt."227 In fact, the Second Circuit distinguished gender non
conforming expression, which it characterized as distinct and easily identifiable.
Discussing the trans teen's claim in Yunits, the court stated that the teen's message
"was readily understood by others . . . because it was such a break from the
norm."228 Returning to Flagg's terminology, Zalewska's gender-conforming
message, the court determined, is transparent against the backdrop of gender
conformity.
The facts of Zalewska, however, belie the notion that the employee's message
was not understood. Zalewska's initial objection-combined with her special order
of a skirted uniform and her subsequent refusal to return it, followed by her
suspension for insubordination-leaves little doubt that her message was clearly
communicated and understood. Zalewska, like Jespersen, sacrificed her job rather
than conform to a gender presentation at odds with her identity. The difference in
outcome from Yunits is that Pat Doe's gender identity was easy for the court to
"read" because it stands out in contrast to the background norm. As discussed in
the preceding Subsection concerning reliance on a medical model, Jennifer Levi
suggested a somewhat different, although related, explanation of the same
phenomenon: Levi attributed the relatively greater success of trans cases to
humanizing the plaintiff through reliance on disability claims. 229 I recognize, as did
Levi, that reliance on a medical model may provide a vehicle that enables a court to
understand the magnitude of the harm experienced. I additionally argue that
shifting the focus to expression may open the door for non-medicalized claims as
well. My hope is that expression claims by trans plaintiffs (whether or not
medicalized) will assist courts in "reading" the background norms and hence the
harm to all persons (whether or not transgender) when we are forced to express
gender in a manner inconsistent with our gender identities.

224. ld.
225. ld. at 318.
226. ld. at 319-20
227. ld. at 320 (emphasis added).
228. Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 320.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114 (discussing the humanizing effect of reliance on
disability claims as a reason for the greater success of trans cases).
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CONCLUSION

Expression challenges, like all gender claims by trans litigants, present
significant obstacles with minimal expectation of success. When appropriate for
the plaintiff, however, I urge that such claims be brought. The most important
reason for bringing such claims is, as the gendered claims for racial civil rights
suggest, that expression of our gender is a fundamental aspect of our humanity.
First Amendment claims, moreover, shift the focus to the state's reason for
suppressing expression---often that the state itself is expressing contrary messages
of gender subordination. In addition, expression may provide a more apt
framework than equality for claims by trans individuals who experience gender
outside of, and in resistance to a binarized, medicalized model. Finally, an
understanding of gender as expression may make the harms of enforced gender
conformity to non-trans claimants visible as well.

